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〈 Abstract 〉
There is a potential for firms to engage in earnings management to influence a credit change 
(Ali and Zhang 2008; Jung et al. 2013; Alissa et al. 2013).  However, Mali and Lim (2016) find that 
firms that engage in earnings management in period t  do not experience a credit rating increase 
in period t+1; rather these firms are more likely to experience a decrease. Their evidence 
suggests that credit rating agencies capture both accrual earnings management (AEM) and real 
earnings management (REM) in the credit watch period (t-1 to t). Firms that potentially experience 
a credit rating change must experience a 1 year credit watch period in advance of potential 
change. Therefore, we conjecture a firm may engage in REM in period t-2 because firms are 
under less scrutiny from rating agencies, and REM is more difficult to detect.
We use the residual from the Dechow et al. model (1995) and Kothari’s (2005) model as 
proxies for AEM. We use models suggested by Cohen et al. (2010) as proxies for REM. Using a 
sample of 1,481 observations from 2002 to 2013, we find a negative association between AEM in 
period t-1 and credit rating changes in period t, suggesting that credit rating agencies consider 
low levels of abnormal accruals as a form of strong corporate governance. We find a positive 
association between REM in period t-2 and a positive change in period t, suggesting that a firm 
may use earnings management to influence credit ratings increase. Moreover, we find no 
association between credit rating decreases and earnings management suggesting that firms have 
the opportunity to engage in earnings management to influence credit ratings. Overall, the results 
suggest that firms may engineer their financial structure by using REM in period t-2 to increase 
the probability of credit rating change.
Key word : credit ratings, earnings management, AEM, REM. 
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〈 국문초록 〉
기업은 신용등급에 유리한 영향을 미치기 위하여 이익조정을 수행하려 할 수 있다(Ali and 
Zhang 2008; Jung et al. 2013; Alissa et al. 2013). 그러나 Mali and Lim (2015)의 연구에 의하면 특
정 시점에 이익조정을 수행한 기업의 신용등급은 그 다음해에 상향조정되지 않고 오히려 강등
되는 경향이 있는 것으로 확인되었다. 이러한 증거는 신용평가기관이 최근 기간의 평가대상 기
업의 발생액 및 실제 활동을 이용한 이익조정 경향을 간파하여 제재를 가하고 있을 가능성을 
제시한다. 일반적으로 신용등급이 변동하는 기업은 직전 년도 중에 평가기관의 집중적인 관찰대
상이 된다. 따라서 신용등급의 상향조정을 기대하는 기업은 그 이전인 t-2기에 이익을 선제적으
로 조정할 가능성이 있고 이 때 발생액을 조정하기 보다는 관찰가능성이 상대적으로 낮은 실제 
활동을 조정할 개연성이 존재한다. 
본 연구에서는 발생액을 이용한 이익조정의 대용치로 Dechow et al. (1995) 및 Kothari et al. 
(2005)의 모형에서 산출되는 잔차를 이용하고 실제활동을 이용한 이익조정의 대용치로 Cohen et 
al.(2010)의 모형에서 구한 잔차를 이용한다. 2002년부터 2013년까지의 기간에 걸친 1,481건의 관
찰치로 구성된 표본으로부터 t-1기의 발생액 이익조정과 t기의 신용등급 변동 사이에 음의 관계
가 있음을 재확인할 수 있었는데 이는 신용평가 기관이 낮은 수준의 비정상 발생액을 효율적인 
지배구조가 작동하고 있음을 나타내는 징후로 간주하고 있음을 시사한다. 또한 t-2기의 실제활
동을 이용한 이익조정과 t기의 신용등급 변화 사이에는 양의 관계가 존재함을 관찰하였는데 이
는 기업이 실제이익조정을 이용하여 등급의 유리한 변경을 유도하는 경향이 있음을 제시한다. 
나아가 기업의 이익조정과 신용등급의 하향변동 사이에는 유의한 관련성이 존재하지 않는 것으
로 나타났는데 이는 기업이 신용평가에 영향을 미칠 수 있는 기회를 누리고 있음을 시사한다. 
요컨대 표본기간 중 국내기업은 t-2기의 선제적 실제이익조정을 이용하여 신용등급의 상향조정 
가능성을 높이려는 경향을 지니고 있는 것으로 판단할 수 있다. 
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I. Introduction
Evidence suggests that managers would take economic actions to manage earnings to 
meet benchmarks (Graham and Harvey 2001; Graham at al 2005).   Previous South 
Korean studies are based on models that suggest that negative earnings management in 
period t influence credit rating changes in period t+1 (Mali and Lim 2016). The study 
suggests that credit rating agencies capture earnings management in the credit watch 
period. Credit ratings agencies predict a firm’s credit ratings 1 year in advance. Thus, 
a firm is unlikely to engage in earnings management in period t-1 to influence credit 
ratings in period t, the credit watch period because a firm is likely under more scrutiny 
from credit rating agencies.  We conjecture that there is an incentive for a firm to 
engage in REM in period t-2 to be placed on the credit watch list in period t-1. It is 
likely that a firm will demonstrate lower level of (REM henceforth) and (AEM 
henceforth) within the credit watch period to demonstrate robust corporate governance. 
Therefore, the opportunistic behaviour of managers a calendar year prior to the 
announcement of possible change is an important consideration. This paper is motivated 
by this caveat. 
The overall period of this research is 2002 to 2013. The sample consists of 1481 
observations. We use the residual from the Dechow et al. model (1995) (DAMJ 
henceforth) and Kothari’s (2005) model (DAKW henceforth) as proxies for accrual 
earnings management AEM. Moreover, we use two proxies for REM. The REM models 
suggested by Cohen et al. (2010) are a combination of the cash flow from operations, 
production cost and discretionary expense models, as suggested by Roychowdhury (2006).
First, we test whether firms that engage in earnings management are able to 
influence their credit ratings in subsequent periods. We perform Multivariate OLS 
regression with lagged independent variables to establish if earnings management in 
period t-2 and t-1 influence credit rating changes in period t. The results suggest that 
accrual AEM have a significant negative association with credit rating changes in period 
t-1, suggesting that firms with higher level of discretionary accruals are more likely to 
experience a credit rating change/downgrade. However, we find that TRM1 in period t-2 
is positively associated with credit rating change in period t. 
Next, we use logistic regression to test the relation between credit ratings increases in 
period t and earnings management in lagged prior periods, period t-2 and t-1. We find 
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REM in period t-2 has a positive relation with positive credit ratings change in period t, 
and firms with lower levels AEM in period t-1 are more likely to experience a credit 
increase. Moreover, we find an insignificant relation between earnings management and 
credit rating decreases suggesting that credit rating agencies do not punish firms that 
engage in AEM or REM; giving firms the opportunity to engage in earnings management 
to influence credit ratings.
We make the following contributions to the extant literature.  To our knowledge, we 
are the first find evidence that in a Korean context, REM may influence credit ratings 
in subsequent periods. A negative association between AEM in period t-1 and credit 
rating change in period t is interpreted as firms signaling strong corporate governance 
within the credit watch period to facilitate a credit rating increase, consistent with 
pervious literature (Mali and Lim 2016). However, our results suggest  that managers 
may use earnings management to engineer their financial structure to influence a credit 
rating increase. A statistically significant negative association between REM in period t-2 
and positive credit rating change is interpreted as managerial opportunistic behaviour in 
order to facilitate credit watch list placement. 
This study expands the literature in several ways. First, we consider both AEM and 
REM measures to establish a relation between earnings management in the period before 
credit rating change, and the period before the credit watch announcement (t-1, t-2). 
Secondly, we perform a series of tests to examine whether level of earnings 
management is significantly related with credit rating increases and decreases. Therefore, 
this analysis can be considered as the most robust analysis of a relation between 
earnings management and credit ratings changes in a South Korean context, suggesting 
that managers may use REM to facilitate placement on the credit watch list.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section II reviews relevant literature 
and develops hypotheses. In Section III, we explain the research design. In Section IV, we 
present details of our results. Section V concludes.
II. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development
2.1 Literature Review
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Credit ratings provide information to market participants about the probability of a 
firm's financial default. The highest broad category in descending order are AAA, AA, A, 
BBB, BB, B, CCC, CC, C, D; each category from AA to CCC is divided into subcategories, 
plus (+) and minus (-) notches.  Firms consider their credit rating when making decisions 
about equity capital (Graham and Harvey 2001; Graham et al.'s 2005). Improving or 
maintaining credit ratings play a key role in corporate financing and investment decisions 
(Hovakimian at al. 2001). Credit ratings and changes have significant cost implications for 
companies (Holthausen and Leftwich 1986; Ederington and Goh 1998; Dichev and 
Piotroski 2001). Firms care deeply about credit ratings, and change leverage structures to 
influence credit rating changes (Kisgen 2006, 2009).
Graham et al.'s (2005) survey evidence finds that 78% of managers would manage 
earnings to meet benchmarks. Jones (1991), Dechow et al. (1995) and Kothari et al. 
(2005) develop models that demonstrate that manager use abnormal level of accruals to 
manage earnings levels opportunistically. Ali and Zhang (2008) find evidence that notch 
category firms use higher levels of earnings management compared middle category 
firms suggesting that firms believe that by inflating earnings they can influence credit 
ratings' decision to upgrade or downgrade. Jung et al. (2013) extends Ali and Zhang’s 
research to consider earnings smoothing as a tool to influence credit ratings. Jung et al. 
(2013) find that earnings smoothing via earnings management is more concentrated 
around plus and minus firms.  
However, firms are likely to use a mix of AEM and REM  to manage reported 
earnings. Gunny (2010) finds a firm may choose between the two earnings management 
mechanisms using the technique that is less costly to them. REM is defined as 
management actions that deviate from normal business practices undertaken for purposes 
of achieving certain earnings thresholds (Roychowdhury, 2006). Gunny (2010) examines 
the relation between REM and ex-post performance. Gunny (2010) finds evidence that 
REM is associated with firms just meeting earnings benchmarks. Zang (2012) finds that 
the trade-off between the two earnings management methods is a function of their 
relative costs. Consistent with Roychowdhury (2006), we identify three levels of abnormal 
‘real activities’; abnormal levels of cash flow from operations (CFO), production costs 
(Prod) and discretionary expenses (SGA). Deviations from normal levels of real activities 
are considered to be real earnings management (the residual from one of the three 
estimation models). The residuals from the linear model are considered to be abnormal 
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levels. Cohen et al. (2010) borrow from Roychowdry (2006) to develop two 
comprehensive models of earnings management because SGA is considered a function of 
(CFO) and (Prod). In this paper, we use the models suggested by Cohen et al. (2010). 
Evidence with regards to the relation between earnings management and credit ratings 
is mixed in South Korea. Oh (2005) finds a positive association between  discretionary 
accruals and credit ratings. On the other hand, there is evidence that REM has a 
negative association with credit ratings (Lee and Chung 2012). Park and Roh (2011) find 
that firms with lower credit ratings engage in earnings management in the subsequent 
period. Ahn and Kim  (2014) find that credit ratings levels have a significantly positive 
correlation with abnormal CFO/abnormal production cost, but have negative correlation 
with abnormal discretionary expenses. Mali and Lim (2016) consider the time lagged 
effect suggested by Alissa et al. (2013), and find a negative relation between earnings 
management in period t and credit rating change in period t+1, suggesting that in the 
credit watch period, a firm that engage in upward earnings management is more likely 
to experience a credit rating decrease.  
We borrow from Alissa et al. (2013), who find that income increasing/decreasing 
earnings management is associated with positive/negative changes in future periods, 
period t+1 to t-5. A potential credit ratings change in period t is decided in period t-1, a 
year in advance. From period t-1 to period t, it would be virtually impossible for a firm 
to experience a credit rating increase after engaging in earnings management because 
credit a rating agency is likely to place firms with the potential credit rating 
increase/decrease on a credit watch list. Therefore, the firm will be under the scrutiny 
of credit rating agencies. However, there is a potential for firms to engage in REM in 
period t-2 to influence credit watch list placement. Cohen and Zarowin (2010) suggest 
executives have a greater willingness to manage earnings through REM and not through 
AEM because AEM is more likely to be scrutinized by auditors and regulators. 
We posit an additional explanation, managers may use REM as a tool to influence a 
credit rating's decision to increase credit rating is REM's relation to default risk. The 
primary concern of credit rating agencies is that firms possess enough cash to meet 
principle payments (Standard and Poor's 2015). Engaging in REM by reducing 
discretionary expenses, providing discounts to customers and increasing production to 
reduce production costs has a direct effect on a firm's cash levels. Thus, whilst REM is 
considered opportunistic, we conjecture that increasing cash reserves has the potential to 
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reduce a credit rating analyst's perception of a firm's potential financial default. The 
above argument is consistent with Ali and Zhang's (2008) evidence that credit rating 
agencies do properly assess REM. 
2.2 Hypothesis Development
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) document a positive association between accounting 
quality and credit rating. Thus, AEM is more likely to be scrutinized by auditors and 
regulators. A credit rating agency's primary concern is default risk, the inability of firms 
to make cash payments. Therefore, a firm is more likely to influence credit ratings 
through engaging in REM compared to AEM. Credit ratings increases/decreases in period 
t are decided in advance in period t-1. Therefore, it is unlikely for a firm placed on the 
credit watch list in period t-1 to benefit from a credit rating change in period t by 
engaging in AEM because of closer scrutiny. We conjecture REM in period t-2 influences 
a credit rating agency's perception of financial performance. Thus, firms are more likely 
to be added to the probationary 1 year watch period after engaging in REM in period 
t-2, and then experience a credit increases in the subsequent period. We predict that a 
firm is more likely to use REM to influence credit ratings because a credit rating agency 
is likely to associate a reduction in expenses and increased cash flow with lower levels 
of risk. Whilst firm's may use AEM to modify financial statements, AEM does not 
influence the ability of a firm to make principal payments. Therefore, based on the 
above, we make the following hypothesis: 
H1: There is a positive relation between REM in period t-2 and credit rating changes in 
period t.
III. Research Design
3.1 Sample Selection
All credit rating and financial data is collected from KISS-VALUE. A total of firm 7,344 
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observations were downloaded from KRX listed firms from 2002-2013. 5,263 firm 
observations were deleted for three reasons, 1) they did not issue bonds; 2) financial 
data was not available; 3) financial firms were deleted consistent with previous studies, 
leaving a total sample of 2,051 from 2002-2013.  An additional 333 observations were 
excluded for the t-1 sample, leaving 1,718 observations. 237 observations were deleted 
for the t-2 sample leaving a total of 1481 observations. The sample selection process is 
illustrated in <Table 1> Panel A. Table 1 <Panel B> shows the sample distribution. A CR 
score of 17 represents the highest credit ratings levels issued by either KIS, KR, NICE 
and SCI within a single calendar year, AAA. All other CR scores represent the remaining 
credit rating levels and are coded with CR scores that take on ordinal value from 16 
(AA+) to 1 (B- to CCC+ and below). We base this approach on Alissa et al. (2013). 
Overall, we find firms that borrow public debt are normally distributed.
<Table 1> Audit fee sample selection by credit ratings
Panel A: CR sample from 2002-2013
Initial CR Sample 2,501
Excluding Post periods (1,020)
Final Sample 1,481
Panel B: Sample selection by credit ratings
CR scores CR Obs CR sores CR Obs
17 AAA 63 8 BBB- 121
16 AA+ 50 7 BB+ 95
15 AA 90 6 BB 83
14 AA- 113 5 BB- 81
13 A+ 114 4 B+ 52
12 A 124 3 B 32
11 A- 140 2 B- 13
10 BBB+ 145 1 Below B- 32
9 BBB 133 Total 1,481
3.2 Model Specifications and Variables Descriptions
3.2.1 Accrual Based Earnings Management
We measure abnormal accruals using the residual from the modified Jones model 
suggested by Dechow (1995) as a proxy for earnings management.  is Net income – 
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cashflow from operations.    is total assets in period t-1. ∆ is changes in 
sales, calculated at sales in period t minus sales in period t-1. ∆, changes in 
accounts receivables is calculated as the changes in accounts receivable in period t and 
period t-1. PPE is property, plant and equipment. The model is shown below as equation 
(1):
Modified Jones Model (Dechow et al., 1995)
        ∆ ∆         (1)
Where,
 : Total accruals (=Net income – cashflow from operations)
   : Total Assets at time t-1
∆ : Changes in sales (=   )
∆ : Changes in accounts receivables (=  )
 : Property, Plant, Equipment
In addition, we use the performance adjusted model, suggested by Kothari et al. (2005). 
We include an additional variable,   in equation (2) since Kothrai et al. (2005) 
suggest that its inclusion helps to decrease potential measurement error. 
Performance Adjusted Model (Kothari et al., 2005);
         ∆ ∆    
      
 (2)
Where,
   : Return on assets at time t-1
3.2.2 Real Earnings Management
  
Real earnings management proxies are based on Roychowdhury’s model (2006). We 
identify three levels of abnormal ‘real activities’; abnormal levels of cash flow from 
operations (CFO) in equation (3), production costs (Prod) in equation (4) and discretionary 
expenses (SGA) in equation (5). Deviations from normal levels of real activities are 
considered to be real earnings management. Positive deviations are interpreted as 
earnings management for production costs (Prod). A negative deviation is interpreted as 
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management making upward earnings management decisions based on (CFO) and 
discretionary expenses (SGA). We multiply –1 by abnormal SGA and abnormal CFO to 
facilitate the interpretation. CFO represents cash flow from operations in period t scaled 
by assets in period t-1. Prod, Production cost at time t is calculated as cost of sales plus 
changes in inventory scaled with assets in t-1. SGA, sales and general administration 
expenses, are calculated as the variable definition above.  is revenue at time t and 
∆ is changes in sales revenue at time t.
          ∆
   
  (3)
Pr          ∆
   ∆     
(4)
               (5)
Where,
   : Cashflow from operation at time t
   : Production cost at time t (=Cost of sales + Changes in inventory)
       : Sales and general administration expenses (=General administration expenses – taxes – 
depreciation expenses – rent expenses – insurance expenses) + (sales expenses + 
research and development expenses)
   : Sales revenue at time t
∆ : Changes in sales revenue at time t
Total REM measures (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010)
In order to capture the total effects of REM activities, we combine the three 
individual measures to calculate two comprehensive metrics of REM activities (Cohen and 
Zarowin, 2010)1). The values from equations (3), (4) and (5) are added into equations (6) 
and (7).
TRM1:    (6)
TRM2:      (7)
1) We do not combine  and , since the same activities that lead to high , also 
lead to high , hence double counting(Cohen and Zarowin, 2010).
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where,
   : Abnormal CFO calculated from the equation (3)
   : Abnormal production cost calculated from the equation (4)
   : Abnormal discretionary expenses calculated from the equation (5)
3.2.3 Earnings Management: Association with Credit Ratings Change
The purpose of equation (8) is to establish if earnings management in period t-2 or 
t-1 has the potential to influence credit ratings in period t. The dependent variable is 
defined previously as an ordinal level representing a firm’s credit rating from AAA to 
below B- and below The independent variable of interest, EM are numerous earnings 
management metrics calculated in equations (1), (2), (6) and (7). Changes is defined as 
CR in period t minus credit ratings in period t-1 in equation (8). The independent 
variables are taken from the credit rating literature based on target leverage (Flannery 
and Rangan, 2006; Hovakimian et al., 2001; Rajan and Zingales, 1995). Size, the natural 
logarithm of total assets. Lev, Total liabilities divided by Total assets is a proxy for 
default risk. Grw,     is a proxy for future growth options. ROA, net 
income divided by total assets and CPS, cashflow from operation divided by outstanding 
shares are proxies for firm performance. ID and YD are industry fixed effect and Year 
fixed effect.
We use multivariate OLS regression to establish a relation between credit rating 
change in period t and lagged values of earnings management in period t-2 and t-1. A 
positive EM coefficient suggests that earnings management influences a credit ratings 
increase. A negative relation would suggest credit rating agencies may reward firms with 
lower earnings management with credit rating increases. Based on previous studies, we 
expect  to be negative.  has the potential to be positive. We posit a different sign 
for  and  suggest that firms engineer their financial structure to influence credit 
rating increase. 
Credit Rating Change Models
                
   
       (8)
Where,
Dependent Variables
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t : Changes in credit ratings (=   )
Variables of Our Interest
 : ABMJ (=Abnormal accruals computed from the modified Jones model, suggested by Dechow 
et al.(1995)
 : ABKW (=Abnormal accruals computed from the performance adjusted model, suggested by 
Kothari et al.(2005)
 : TRM1 (=)
 : TRM2 =    )
The purpose of equations (9) and (10) is to establish a relation between earnings 
management in period t-2 and t-1 and credit ratings increases / decreases in period t. 
To test the relation between earnings management and a positive credit rating change, 
we use logistic regression, where D_Pos takes the value of 1 if a credit rating increases 
in period t, all other observations take the value of 0. To test the relation between 
earnings management and negative credit rating change, we use logistic regression, 
where D_Ng takes the value of 1 if a credit rating decrease in period t, all other 
observations take the value of 0.
In equation (9) we capture the association between earnings management in period t-2 
and t-1 and a firm experiencing a credit ratings increase in period t. We interpret a 
positive EM coefficient as firms have experiencing a credit rating increase due to 
earnings management. A negative, result would suggest that firms with lower levels of 
earnings management are more likely to experience a credit rating increase. We expect 
 to show a negative sign, and conjecture that  may be positive. Equation (10) tests 
if credit rating agencies punish firms that engage in earnings management.  
Positive/negative  or  would suggest that credit rating agencies punish/reward firms 
with higher/lower levels of earnings management with credit rating decreases/increases. 
                
   
     (9)
                
   
       (10)
Where,
Dependent Variables
: Dummy variable that takes 1 if credit rating increased from period t-1 to t, 0 otherwise
: Dummy variable that takes 1 if credit rating decreased from period t-1 to t, 0 otherwise
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VI. Empirical Results
4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlation
<Table 2> provides details about our sample's central tendency and standard deviations 
for all variables of interest. Overall, the average credit rating is 10.46, between the 
investment grade threshold and non-investment grade threshold, BBB+ and A. The results 
show that the mean for size is positive as expected (20.68). Positive leverage is expected 
because bonds are a form of debt that a firm has acquired. Firms that borrow equity in 
the forms bonds have positive performance as proxied by ROA (0.02) and CPS (5.68). 
Overall, 17% of the firms make a financial loss. The average levels of earnings 
management are close to zero for all samples. However, the results suggest sufficient 
variation in the earnings management metrics DAMJ, DAKW, TRM1 and TRM2.
<Table 2> Descriptive Statistics of Main Variables
Panel A. Full sample
Variable Obs Mean S. D. Min Max
CR 1481 10.46 3.84 1 17
DAMJ 1481 -0.00 0.11 -1.29 0.97
DAKW 1481 -0.00 0.07 -0.38 0.58
Total_Rm1 1481 -0.03 0.23 -2.01 1.24
Total_Rm2 1481 -0.02 0.15 -1.18 1.26
size 1481 20.68 1.61 16.80 25.76
lev 1481 0.52 0.19 0.02 1.72
grw 1481 0.08 0.41 -0.99 11.35
Loss 1481 0.17 0.38 0 1
ROA 1481 0.02 0.15 -3.47 3.36
CPS 1481 5.68 15.54 -84.18 167.18
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<Table 3> Pearson Correlations 
 CR size lev Grw ROA CPS Loss DAMJ DAKW TRM1 TRM2
CR 1.00           
Size 0.52*** 1.00          
Lev -0.42*** 0.02** 1.00         
Grw 0.02 0.04 -0.03 1.00        
ROA 0.23*** 0.12*** -0.30*** 0.10*** 1.00       
CPS 0.28*** 0.28*** -0.21*** 0.02 0.12*** 1.00      
Loss -0.28*** -0.10*** 0.35*** -0.15*** -0.43*** -0.16*** 1.00     
DAMJ -0.08*** 0.04*** -0.16*** 0.10*** 0.31*** -0.11*** -0.26*** 1.00    
DAKW -0.04*** -0.04*** 0.04*** 0.09*** 0.03*** -0.25*** -0.03*** 0.63*** 1.00   
TRM1 -0.19*** -0.09*** 0.14*** -0.03 -0.08*** -0.17*** 0.08*** 0.04*** 0.12*** 1.00  
TRM2 -0.21*** -0.14*** 0.16*** -0.05** -0.09*** -0.28*** 0.10*** 0.22*** 0.42*** 0.85*** 1.00
Note 1: Variable Definitions     
 : Credit ratings levels
DAMJ  : Abnormal accruals computed from the modified Jones model, suggested by Dechow et 
al.(1995)
DAKW  : Abnormal accruals computed from the performance adjusted model, suggested by 
Kothari et al.(2005)
TRM1 : 
TRM2 :     
 : Natural logarithm of total assets at time t-1
 : Debt ratio
 : Sales growth ratio
 : Return on assets
 : Cashflow from operation scaled by total outstanding shares
 : Dummy variable that takes 1 if a firm experienced loss at time t-1, 0 otherwise
Note 2: ***, **, * t test indicate significance level at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively.
<Table 3>  shows the Pearson correlations for the variables of interest. Size is 
positively correlated with credit ratings, suggesting that larger firms have larger credit 
ratings. Moreover, firms with lower levels of leverage have higher credit ratings. The 
association between growth and credit rating is insignificant. The proxies for 
performance ROA and CPS are positively correlated with CR (ROA 0.23; CPS 0.28), 
suggesting that firms with positive performance have higher credit ratings. There is a 
negative association between credit ratings and loss, suggesting that firms with lower 
credit ratings are more likely to be loss firms. There is a negative association between 
credit ratings and EM metrics consistent with previous literature. We test for 
multicollinearity using VIF tests. We find the average VIF value to be 1.01. The most 
correlated variables are 3.16, suggesting that multicollinearity does not influence our 
results.
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<Table 4> Multvariate OLS Regression Analysis (Changes) 
              
    
Var Sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
DAMJ t-1 - -1.17
(-2.21)**
DAMJ t-2 +/- 0.58
(1.03)
DAKW t-1 - -2.06
(-2.90)***
DAKW t-2 +/- -0.16
(-0.24)
TRM1 t-1 - 0.32
(1.38)
TRM1 t-1 +/- 1.12
(2.92)***
TRM2 t-1 - 0.26
(0.87)
TRM2 t-2 +/- 0.70
(1.61)
Size -0.10 -0.01 -0.01 -0.12
(-0.33) (-0.35) (-0.32) (-0.35)
Lev 0.01 0.16 0.15 0.40
(0.01) (0.54) (0.05) (0.13)
Grw 0.11 0.11 0.15 0.15
(1.02) (1.02) (1.35) (1.33)
ROA 0.51 0.34 0.94 0.93
(1.10)** (0.76) (2.01)** (1.99)**
CPS 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(-0.30) (-0.06) (1.08) (0.98)
Loss -0.62 -0.60 -0.56 -0.56
(-3.91)*** (-3.55***) (-3.33)*** (-3.33)***
ID Included Included Included Included
YD Included Included Included Included
Chi2 5.45*** 6.30*** 5.02*** 4.79***
PseudoR2 0.0206 0.0245 0.0187 0.0176
OBS 1481 1481 1481 1481
4.2 Multivariate Analysis Results 
<Table 4> shows results of multivariate OLS regression with lagged independent 
variables. The dependent variable, Changes is a continuous variable, calculated by 
subtracting credit rating scores at time t-1 from credit ratings t. The variables of 
interest are the levels of earnings management in lagged periods. We find a negative 
association between AEM in period t-1, and credit rating changes in period t, suggesting 
that firms with higher level of discretionary accruals are more likely to experience a 
credit rating change/downgrade. We interpret that credit rating agencies effectively 
monitor AEM as a proxy of corporate governance; thus do not reward firms that engage 
in AEM opportunistically.
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where;
: Changes in credit ratings (=   )
DAMJ: Abnormal accruals computed from the modified Jones model, suggested by Dechow et 
al.(1995)
DAKW: Abnormal accruals computed from the performance adjusted model, suggested by Kothari 
et al.(2005)
TRM1: 
TRM2:     
 : Natural logarithm of total assets at time t-1 
: Debt ratio
 : Sales growth ratio
: Return on assets
: Cashflow from operation scaled by total outstanding shares
: Dummy variable that takes 1 if a firm experienced loss at time t-1, 0 otherwise
ID: Industry fixed effect
YD: Year fixed effect
Note 1: ***, **, * t test indicate significance level at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively.
There is an insignificant relation between REM in period t-1 and credit changes in 
period t. However, the relation between a CR change in period t and REM in period t-2 
is statistically significant for TRM1 at the 1%.  The results suggest that a firm may 
signal higher performance or engage in earnings management opportunistically through 
increasing production to facilitate placement on the credit watch list to potentially 
experience a credit rating change in the next period. The control variables show 
expected signs consistent with our Pearson correlations.
In <Table 5>, we provide results for logistic regression testing the relation between a 
positive change in period t and earnings management in period t-2 and t-1. We  
compare the levels of earnings of 304 that experience a credit rating increase in period 
t (against a sample of 1,481 observations). The variables of  interest are the levels of 
earning management in previous periods.  We find a negative relation between AEM 
measures in period t-1 and credit rating upgrades in period t at the 5% level, suggesting 
that firms with high level of earnings management are more likely to decrease their 
credit rating or remain at an unchanged level. The evidence is consistent with previous 
finding that credit ratings agencies have the potential to consider AEM management as 
an opportunistic accounting practice; hence, reward firms with lower levels of earnings 
management with credit rating increase between period t and t-1.
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<Table 5> Logistic Regression: Positive Change vs All Other
              
    
Var Sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
DAMJ t-1 - -1.32
(-1.98)**
DAMJ t-2 +/- -0.21
(-0.27)
DAKW t-1 - -2.26
(-2.36)**
DAMJ t-2 +/- -0.20
(0.25)
TRM1 t-1 - 1.64
(0.10)
TRM1 t-2 +/- 0.97
(1.68)*
TRM2 t-1 - 1.34
(1.50)
TRM2 t-2  +/- 1.03
(1.70)*
Size 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.11
(2.47)*** (3.51)*** (3.49)*** (2.46)**
Lev 0.63 0.73 0.71 0.62
(1.47) (1.99)** (1.93)* (1.44)
Grw 0.17 0.90 0.07 0.14
(1.35) (0.73) (-0.58) (1.13)
ROA 3.85 3.83 3.36 3.21
(2.80)*** (3.04)*** (2.73)*** (2.50)**
CPS 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(-0.35) (-0.72) (-0.08) (-0.28)
Loss -0.36 -0.67 -0.64 -0.32
(-1.29) (-2.75)*** (-2.64)*** (-1.19)
ID Included Included Included Included
YD Included Included Included Included
Chi2 35.42*** 37.30*** 34.02*** 34.74***
PseudoR2 0.0256 0.0238 0.0310 0.0238
OBS 1481 1481 1481 1481
Where,
: Dummy variable that takes 1 if credit rating increased from period t, 0 otherwise
 : ABMJ (=Abnormal accruals computed from the modified Jones model, suggested by Dechow 
et al.(1995)
 : ABKW (=Abnormal accruals computed from the performance adjusted model, suggested by 
Kothari et al.(2005)
 : TRM1 (=)
 : TRM2 =    )
 : Natural logarithm of total assets at time t-1
: Debt ratio
 : Sales growth ratio
: Return on assets
: Cashflow from operation scaled by total outstanding shares
: Dummy variable that takes 1 if a firm experienced loss at time t-1, 0 otherwise
ID: Industry fixed effect
YD: Year fixed effect
Note 1: ***, **, * z test indicate significance level at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively.
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<Table 6> Logistic Regression: Negative Change vs All Other
              
         Var Sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
DAMJ t-1 +/- 0.00(0.00)
DAMJ t-2 +/- -1.18
(-1.09)
DAKW t-1 +/- 1.63 (1.15)
DAKW t-2 +/- 0.52
(0.39)
TRM1 t-1 +/- 0.26  (0.34) 
TRM1 t-2 +/- -0.12
(-0.16)
TRM2 t-1 +/- 0.36 (0.59)
TRM2 t-2 +/- -0.04
(-0.05)
Size 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05
(0.84) (1.82)* (0.86) (0.89)
Lev 0.91 0.50 0.94 0.92
(1.44) (0.82) (1.49) (1.45)
Grw -0.25 -0.26 -0.27 -0.27
(-1.73)* (-1.85)* (-1.94)* (-1.95)*
ROA -0.47 -0.11 -0.19 -0.20
(-0.88) (-0.13) (-0.20) (-0.21)
CPS -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02
(-1.52) (-1.45) (-1.94)* (-1.70)*
Loss 0.67 0.68 0.65 0.65
(-2.87)*** (2.90)*** (2.80)* (2.82)***
ID Included Included Included Included
YD Included Included Included Included
Chi2 23.71*** 22.67*** 29.85*** 30.58***
PseudoR2 0.0306 0.0292 0.0292 0.0299
OBS 1481 1481 1481 1481
Where,
:Dummy variable that takes 1 if credit rating decreased in period t, 0 otherwise
 : ABMJ (=Abnormal accruals computed from the modified Jones model, suggested by Dechow 
et al.(1995)
 : ABKW (=Abnormal accruals computed from the performance adjusted model, suggested by 
Kothari et al.(2005)
 : TRM1 (=)
 : TRM2 =    )
 : Natural logarithm of total assets at time t-1
: Debt ratio
 : Sales growth ratio
: Return on assets
: Cashflow from operation scaled by total outstanding shares
: Dummy variable that takes 1 if a firm experienced loss at time t-1, 0 otherwise
ID: Industry fixed effect
YD: Year fixed effect
Note 1: ***, **, * z test indicate significance level at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively.
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There is no relation between REM in period t-1 and credit rating changes in period t, 
suggesting that credit rating agencies do not reward firms that engage in REM in period 
t-1. However, there is positive a relation between earnings management in period t-2 
and credit rating changes in period t, after controlling for period t-1 at the 10% level 
(1.68 TRM1 and 1.70  for TRM2). The results suggest that there is a possibility that 
firms engage in earnings management  opportunistically to influence a credit rating 
agency's decision to place a firm on the credit watch list. Taken together, the results 
suggest that firms may use a combination of earnings management strategies to 
influence credit ratings, consistent with hypothesis 1. We interpret the above  results as 
managers using REM in period t-2 to signal superior performance by increasing earnings  
consistent with the conjecture that managers are likely to prefer REM because  AEM is 
more likely to be scrutinized by credit rating agencies. 
Next, we use logistic regression to compare the levels of earnings management of 111 
firms that experience a credit rating decrease in period t against the sample of 1,481 
observations. The results in <Table 6> provide insignificant results, suggesting that there 
is no association between earnings management in period t-2, t-1 and credit rating 
downgrades in period t. The results suggest that credit rating agencies do not necessarily 
punish firms for engaging in AEM or REM. The results suggest that credit rating 
agencies do not consider themselves to be auditors and take financial statement data as 
accurate and assume financial statements to be reasonable and accurate (Securities and 
Exchange Commission, 2003; Standard & Poor’s, 2008; Standard & Poor's 2015 ). Thus, 
given that credit ratings do not punish firms that engage in earnings management, firms 
are not likely to be dissuaded from engaging in earnings management to influence credit 
ratings. 
V. Additional Analysis
We include numerous additional controls for robustness including earnings volatility, the 
presence of a BIG4 auditor, audit fee (hour) and FOR, foreign investor share ownership. 
Firms followed by BIG4 are controlled using a dummy variables that take the value of 1 
if a firm’s external auditor is a BIG4 auditor, 0 otherwise. Untabulated results suggest 
that FOR is strongly associated with credit ratings at time t suggesting that higher 
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foreign investor share ownership is considered to influence corporate governance; 
therefore, has the potential lower credit risk. BIG4 audit firms have a positive relation 
with credit rating, suggesting that credit rating agencies may consider firms audited by 
Big4 auditors to have lower credit risk.  
V. Conclusions
We examine the relation between earnings management and credit rating changes in 
subsequent periods. We find a negative association with abnormal accruals in period t-1 
and credit rating changes in period t, consistent with previous literature. However, we 
find a positive association between REM in period t-2 and a positive change in period t. 
We conjecture that managers opportunistically increase earnings to demonstrate strong 
financial performance in period t-2 to influence a credit rating agency's decision to 
place a firm on the credit watch period in period t-1. The evidence is consistent with 
Cohen et al.'s (2010) suggestions that firms are more likely to engage in REM because 
AEM is more likely to be scrutinized by auditors and regulators. Moreover, we posit that 
it is more likely for a firm to be considered for a future credit rating increase after 
engaging in REM because REM is liked to cash, which is linked to the ability to make 
principle payments, the primary consideration of default risk. We do not find an 
association between credit rating decrease and earnings management suggesting that 
firms have the opportunity to engage in earnings management to influence credit ratings. 
Overall, we interpret the results as firm's engineering their financial structure to 
experience a credit rating increase. Thus, the paper adds to the extant literature with 
evidence that REM may influence credit ratings in subsequent periods, and managers 
may use REM to improve credit ratings in a Korean context.
A weakness of the paper is that results based on a Korean context may not be 
applicable to other countries because the financial, legal and legislative systems may be 
different. Possible future research may examine the relationship between earnings 
management in prior periods and subsequent credit rating an international context. 
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